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I.Introduction
Japan experienced a precipitous decline in fertility during the decade
following the postwar baby boom of 1947—49, and then her fertility rates
leveled off. The rapid decline in fertility paralleled liberalization of abortion
laws and an active campaign to disseminate contraceptive information.
Given these developments and the apparent subordination of women in
Japanese culture, one might be inclined to ascribe the fertility decline to
increased availability of abortions and other means of birth control and
to doubt the explanatory relevance of economic theory which emphasizes
the effects of rising wages and educational attainment of women on
fertility. The conclusion that emerges from this study, however, is that
the basic economic forces identified by the new economic theory of
household decision making have been operating to produce a con-
siderable part of the observed differentials and trends in Japanese
fertility.1 Indeed, increased use of abortion and contraceptive devices
appears to have been induced to some extent by economic forces.2
I benefitedgreatlyfrom comments and suggestions made by Gary S. Becker, Margaret
L. Hashimoto, Masatoshi Kuratani, H. Gregg Lewis, Gail Makinen, Jacob Mincer,
Marc Nerlove, Douglas S. Paauw, Gary Saxonhouse, T. W. Schultz, T. Paul Schultz,
Miron Stano, Kozo Yamamura, and Dennis Zimmerman. Haeng-Ja Song's research
assistance is gratefully acknowledged. Sachio Kohjima of the Bank of Tokyo obtained
some data for me. This paper was written while I was at Wayne State University.
I thank the Economics Department at Wayne State University, where this research was
performed, for providing resources for my research. Finally,I alone am responsible
for the contents of this paper.
Silver (1966) found that births, and to a somewhat lesser extent marriages, responded
positively to both ordinary and Kuznets cycles between 1878 and 1957, and that the
magnitudes of the cyclical responses of births were similar to those in the United States
and Britain.
2Itwould be premature, however, to look for exact magnitudes of the parameters of
the Japanese fertility function or for a complete explanation of fertility trends. The
statistical model employs only a few key variables and is still formulated in static terms.
The statistical analysis is performed mainly on cross-section data which are highly
aggregated. Further refinements of the model and the data base are both desirable and
possible.
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II.Differentials and Trends in Japanese Fertility: Background
The phenomenal growth of the Japanese economy during the postwar
years has been widely noted. Between 1950 and 1969, real gross national
product grew at an average annually compounded rate of close to 10
percent, while the comparative rate for the United States was 4 percent.
Real gross national product per capita grew at 9 percent, contrasted with
2 percent for the United States. The rapid industrialization of the
Japanese economy is documented in the share of agricultural employment,
which fell from about 49 percent in 1950 to 30 percent in 1960 and then
declined to less than 18 percent in 1970. Employment opportunities for
women grew also; the proportion of women in nonagricultural employ-
ment increased from 29 percent in 1950 to 35 percent in 1960 and to 37
percent in 1970.
Against this background of rapid economic development, Japanese
fertility dropped sharply (fig. 1). The crude birth rate, which had been
about 35 in the late l940s, first dipped below 30 in 1950; 5 years later it
fell below 20 and stayed there. Fertility decline in Japan began about
1920, but the rate of decline accelerated after By the early 1960s
the persistent decline appears to have ended, and then the leveling off
began. A sharp drop in fertility in 1966 in response to the superstition of
Hinoeuma vividly underscores that fertility is very much within the realm
of deliberate control.4 Birth rates just before and after 1966 were to some
extent adjustments to the 1966 phenomenon.
Rural regions experienced a more rapid and a more persistent birth
rate decline than industrial areas (see table 1). Only part of this difference
is accounted for by shifts in age composition as women of childbearing
age migrated from rural to urban regions.5 Until 1962, the average num-
ber of children ever born by duration of marriage for women married
before they were 30 years old continuously declined for all groups (see
table 2). There was a slight increase between 1962 and 1967 among
women married less than 10 years. But completed fertility measured
approximately by the fertility of women married more than 10 years
continued to decline. Table 3 provides more direct evidence on the
decrease in desired completed fertility during the postwar years, 1950—6 7.
Between the two periods, 1920—22 and 1940—42, the crude birth rate declined from
35.2 to 30.7 (7.1 percent per decade), and the total fertility rate declined from 5.21 in
1920 to 4.11 in 1940 (11.2 percent per decade). Between the 1949—51 and 1959—61
periods, the crude birth rate dropped from 28.8 to 17.2 (40.3 percent), and the total
fertility rate from 3.72 to 1.99 (46.5 percent).
1-finotuma takesplace every 60 years. The superstition is that a woman born in that
year will "eat men alive," which is to say that she will be very aggressive and no man will
want to marry her.
'According to Japan's Institute of Population Problems, holding constant the age
composition of the population at 1930 values, the birth rate in urban areas (shi) dropped
from 26.4 in 1950 to 17.8 in 1960 and then rose to 19.0 in 1965. The birth rate in rural
areas (gun) continued to drop from 32.7 in 1950 to 19.0 in 1960 and to 17.6 in 1965.
These results were reported in Aoki (1970, table 24).Si 72
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Fm. 1.—Infant death rate is deaths at ages 0—1 per 1,000 live births. Abortion rate is
number of registered abortions per 100 live births. Other vital statistics have their usual
definitions. (Data on births, deaths, and infant deaths are fromJapan Ministry of Health
and Welfare [1970]; abortion rate, total fertility rate, and net reproduction rate are from
Mainichi Newspaper Company [1970, p. 246]).
For families already having two children, the proportion desiringno
additional children increased throughout the years, while the proportion
desiring two and three or more additional children continued to decline.
Moreover, the percentage of couples with "no idea" how many addi-
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TABLE 2
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BoRE




1940 1957 1962 1967
1—4 0.98 0.93 0.87 1.06
5—9 2.34 2.16 1.92 1.95
10—14 3.55 2.92 2.46 2.28
15—19 4.39 3.62 2.85 2.66
20+
All groups
5.17 4.72 3.90 3.43
3.49 2.86 2.37 2.28
and Nakano (1967, table 3) and Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare (1968, table 24B).
NOTE.—Includesmarried women with husbandpresent.
awareness of family planning in later years. My estimates of completed
fertility (table 3) also show a pronounced decline over the years.6
The rapid decline in fertility in the postwar years coincided with the
liberalization of policies on abortions and contraceptive use. Abortion
was first legalized in September 1948, and in June 1949, grounds for
abortion and sterilization were extended. After May 1952, abortion could
be obtained with only the consent of man and wife. Alarmed at the
increased number of abortions and possible health hazards from abortion,
the government in 1952 initiated programs to disseminate birth control
information through local agencies. Resort to abortion continued to
increase, however, until 1957, when the number of abortions per 100 live
births reached its peak of 71.6.
IlLEconomic Framework for Fertility Analysis
The following discussion will emphasize the effect of parental education
on fertility. The testing of economic hypotheses about the effect of parental
education on fertility also provides a test of the usefulness of economic
theory in interpreting Japanese fertility behavior.
The basic proposition in the economic theory of fertility is that observed
changes and differentials in fertility reflect to a large extent changes and
differentials in the demand for fertility and that resource constraints on
6Thetrue decline is likely to have been even more rapid than these estimates suggest
because my calculations may underestimate completed fertility to a greater extent in
earlier years. First, the true mean of the open-ended class would be larger than three, the
figure used for my calculations, by a larger amount in earlier years if completed fertility
declined over time. Second, the group with "no idea" as to number of additional children
desired was omitted from the calculations. If people gave the "no idea" answer because
of greater ignorance (lower level of education) than other respondents, then economic
analysis predicts their desired completed fertility to be greater than that of others. This
omission would have mattered less in recent years because of general declines in fertility
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households exert appreciable effects on fertility demand. Following
Becker (1960), most economic models of fertility view children as
primarily consumer durables. In this conception, a flow of services
emanates from the stock of children, and these services enter the parents'
utility function. Since parents must make outlays (e.g., food, clothing,
housing, and, most important, their time) to obtain child services, they
are not free goods, but command a price. To be quite general, therefore,
demand for fertility is determined by the preferences of parents, the
resources available to parents, and the cost of producing child services
relative to the cost of other commodities (usually identified collectively
as the standard of living) that also yield utility.7
Typically, the fertility rate has declined in countries experiencing
sustained growth in real income. Since growth in real income is usually
brought about by growth in real wages, this phenomenon may be in-
terpreted as reflecting the dominance of substitution over income effects.
An increase in real income would, other things being equal, increase the
number of children per family unless the number of children was an
"inferior good."8 Assuming that child services are more time-intensive
for mothers than the standard of living, an increase in the wife's wage
rate would raise the relative price of child services, imparting a substi-
tution effect away from them.9 Relying on income and wage rates alone,
one may, therefore, interpret the decline in fertility accompanying growth
in real income as reflecting the dominance of the substitution effect of a
rise in the wife's wage rate over the combined income effects of increases
in both spouses' wage rates. However, both income and wage rates are
correlated with the educational levels of the parents and the level of
contraceptive knowledge, relationships which complicate the empirical
estimation of the magnitudes of the income and substitution effects.
The effect of educational attainment of parents on fertility has been
investigated more thoroughly than that of income or wage rates by Ben-
Porath (1970a, l970b, 1973) and Michael (1971) among others. Educa-
tional attainment of parents is typically negatively associated with their
Most models use the tune-allocation framework (Becker 1965) and they are usually
cast in a lifetime dimension, thereby avoiding the complexities of timing and spacing of
births (see, for example, Ben-Porath [1973], DeTray [1972], Michael [1971], and Willis
[1973]). Some problems with the use of static models are discussed by T. Paul Schultz
(1973).
8Alsorelevant to the decline in fertility are changes in the quality of children as real
income rises. Research on the demand for consumer durables suggests that the effect of
income on the demand for quality is greater than on the demand for quantity. Even
assuming numbers of children are not inferior, parents would tend to a greater extent to
spend more per child than to have more children as real income rises.
9An increase in the husband's wage rate, however, is expected to produce mainly
income effects because his time intensities are assumed to differ little between child
services and the standard of living and because his wage income constitutes a large
proportion of family income (see, for example, Ben-Porath [1973]).
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fertility. Proposed explanations of this relationship fall generally into
three groups: the tastes hypothesis, the cost-of-fertility-control hypothesis,
and the cost-of-time hypothesis.
According to one version of the tastes hypothesis, parents with higher
education may be more "rational" than others in that they tend to regard
the number of children as a decision variable, while less educated parents
regard it as something beyond their control (Ben-Porath 1970b). There-
fore, parents with higher levels of education would control fertility more
and have fewer children than other parents. Another version is that
education affects the perception of child quality (Ben-Porath 1970b,
Gardner 1972). Parents with more education may desire a greater
expenditure per child to obtain a given level of child quality. Other
things being equal, they will have a smaller number of children. Econo-
mists have not succeeded in incorporating such taste factors in their
theory in ways that generate testable hypotheses. Such taste factors are
still regarded as residuals.
The second explanation hypothesizes that parents with more education
have better access to information about birth control devices and are more
efficient at using them. In other words, education lowers the cost of
fertility control. More educated parents would engage in fertility control
to a greater extent than other parents, other things, particularly the
benefit of control, being the same. This hypothesis may partly explain the
negative association between education and fertility.'0
The third explanation emphasizes the effect of education on fertility
through its effects on the cost of time. In the time-allocation framework
of the fertility model, education is assumed to raise the productivity of
time spent at home in the production of commodities (such as child
services and the standard of living) as well as that of time spent in the
labor force. An increase in the productivity of time at work leads to an
increased real wage rate, thereby raising the relative prices of time-
intensive commodities. An increase in the productivity at home, say, at
the same rate for all commodities, lowers the relative prices of time-
intensive commodities. An increased productivity at home or market
also results in increased real income, imparting income effects. The full
effect of education on the demand for children is the net of these forces.
To rely on the cost-of-time hypothesis to explain the negative correlation
between education and fertility, one must argue that the substitution
10Moreeducated people may also use birth control more than others because they
desire fewer children, i.e., the benefit of birth control is greater for them. Both Becker
(1960, p.2 18) and Ben-Porath (19706, p.6)proposea test of the hypothesis that education
lowers the cost of fertility control. If improvement in birth control techniques comes as a
once-and-for-all change, then fertility differentials among educational groups would
widen at first but would tend to narrow over time as information on birth control measures
became more diffused (see Section IV below for some evidence of a differential rate of
diffusion among educational groups of birth control techniques in Japan after 1948-52).Si 78 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
effect imparted by education outweighs the income effect. One plausible
case is that education, especially of the wife, raises the productivity of
time spent in the market more than that of time spent in producing child
services or the standard of living. In this case, the relative price of child
services rises, causing substitution effects away from them." The substi-
tution effect of the husband's education is likely to be small, assuming
that time intensity varies little between the two commodities for him.
The husband's education is expected, therefore, to exert mainly income
effects (Ben-Porath 1973).
The cost-of-time hypothesis has played a central role in the economic
analysis qf fertility. It emphasizes the role of the relative price of child
services, and its predictions are empirically distinguishable, at least for
Japan, from those of the tastes and the cost-of-fertility-control hypotheses.
The latter two hypotheses predict that the education of either parent will
be negatively associated with fertility, but they leave the relative impor-
tancé of the effects of each parent's education an empirical question. In
Japan, where the husband apparently dominates familydecision-
making,'2 one would expect his education to be at least as important as
the wife's education, if not more so. The cost-of-time hypothesis predicts
that the negative association between education and fertility is more
strongly manifested when the education variable refers to the wife's
rather than the husband's education. The husband's education would be
positively correlated, if anything, with fertility when other things, in
particular the level of contraceptive knowledge, are the same. In other
words, husband's education serves as a proxy for family wealth, while
wife's education represents the price of child services.
These three hypotheses, however, are not necessarily mutually ex-
clusive. They help identify possible mechanisms through which parents'
education affects fertility. For example, the cost-of-time and the cost-of-
fertility-control hypotheses would best be viewed not as alternatives but
as complementary hypotheses. The cost-of-time hypothesis emphasizes
forces affecting the demand for the service of birth control, a demand
which is derived from the desired reduction in births, given the level of
fecundity. Underlying this demand is the demand for fertility. The cost-
of-fertility-control hypothesis emphasizes the supply side, or the cost of
"Evenif the wife does not work in the market in her lifetime, her shadow price of time
could be increased by education, making child services more expensive (see Gronau
[1971]).
12Asurvey of 422 couples in the Saitama prefecture in 1960 showed that 76 percent
were using condoms, a device for the husband's use, and that 62 percent had the husband
obtain the contraceptives. The same study showed that for 70 percent of white-collar
workers, 52 percent of farmers, and 51 percent of laborers, the husband was responsible
for obtaining contraceptive devices (Muramatsu 1962). Matsuinoto, Koizumi, and
Nohara (1972, p. 254) also report that husbands are primarily responsible for decisions
concerning family limitation.POSTWAR FERTILITY IN JAPAN Si 79
achieving the desired reduction in births. The cost-of-time hypothesis
has been the most useful to economists for analyzing information on
fertility behavior.
IV.Empirical Analysis
Study of Japan appears to offer an opportunity to obtain evidence
concerning both the effects on fertility of decreases in the cost of pre-
venting births and changes in fertility demand. Thus, I want below first
to examine evidence concerning the proposition that both decreased
demand for fertility and increased access to abortions and contraceptive
techniques contributed to the phenomenal postwar decline in Japanese
fertility.
Abortion, Contraceptive Use, and Fertility
The rapid decline in Japanese fertility in the postwar decade coincided,
as I have stated, with abortion liberalization measures and the subsequent
dissemination of information about other means of fertility control. It is
tempting to explain the rapid decline in fertility as simply the result of a
widespread resort to abortion. According to this view, many births prior
to abortion legalization were unwanted: the liberalization of birth-
control policies simply eliminated this excess fertility. In other words, if
abortion had not been legalized,fertility would not have declined
appreciably. But since fertility in Japan had been declining persistently
since around 1920, there is a presumption that it would have declined
even in the absence of abortion reform.
Since abortions and other fertility-control measures entail costs, both
monetary and nonmonetary, the extent of use of these measures pre-
sumably was influenced by considerations of gains and costs. Abortion
legalization and birth control information programs certainly decreased
the costs of fertility control, leading to increased use of control measures.
On the demand side, as discussed in Section III, the main determinant
of the demand for fertility control is the demand for fertility. A fuller
interpretation of the developments in Japan would be that the price of
child services increased and demand for fertility declined, leading to an
increased demand for fertility control, and that the increased availability
of birth control measures and abortions facilitated the attainment of
lower fertility. Put differently, even without the liberalization of abortion
and other control policies, resort to illegal abortion and the use of con-
traceptives would have grown because of the increase in the price of child
services. In fact, the availability of illegal abortions had been growing
before 1948, and the Eugenics Law of 1948 was motivated by hygienics,
not by intent of population control (Muramatsu 1967). In short, legaliz-
ation and liberalization of control measures were not so much autonomousSi8o JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
events as responses by authorities to increased demand for fertility control
and the health hazards of illegal practices.
How much did legalization of abortion contribute to the rapid decline
in fertility? To answer this question accurately, one would have to
estimate (1) the increase in the number of abortions caused by abortion
legalization, and (2) the proportion of those abortions that would have
terminated in births had there been no lcgal abortions. Since such esti-
mates are beyond the scope of this paper,13 Jreport the results of a crude
calculation. Assuming that all pregnancies aborted legally would have
terminated in live births if abortions had been illegal, I calculated, for
each year from 1949 to 1961, the "maximum" general fertility rate as
births plus abortions per 1,000 women of ages iO—49.'4 The excess of
actual fertility decline over any decline in the "maximum" fertility rate
can be viewed as a measure of fertility decline due to abortion.
Between the 1949—5 1 and 1959—61 periods, the actual general fertility rate
dropped by 44 percent, from 93 to 52. According to my calculations, the
"maximum" general fertility rate decreased by 22 percent, from 111 to
87. Thus, it would appear that abortions about doubled the rate of
decline in the general fertility rate during the decade after 1950.1 5 But
resort to abortion by no means accounted for the entire fertility decline.
Indeed, the rate of decline in the estimated "maximum" rate isstill
substantially greater than the rate of decline in the actual fertility rate
during the prewar years.'6 This evidence of a substantialfertility
decline—indeed, a possible acceleration of the prewar decline—after
adjusting for the effect of abortions suggests that the actual fertility decline
partly represents decreases in the demand for fertility.
13Inprinciple, effects of legal abortions on fertility in any year could be assessed from
a simultaneous-equations model in which key çndogenous variables would be the fertility
rate and prices of abortions and of contraceptive measures. Once the effect of legalization
on the prices of abortions and contraceptive measures was estimated, the ultimate effect
on fertility could be obtained from the demand-for-fertility function.
Theseare maximum estimates for each year of the fertility rate in the absence of
legal abortions because, if abortions had been illegal, some pregnancies would have been
aborted illegally or prevented by other means. In other words, the abortions in each year
were not solely due to decreases in costs but also to increases in the demand for fertility
control. On the other hand, these estimates may understate the true maximum values
because of underreporting of abortions. Muramatsu (1960) estimated that in 1955 at
most 77 percent of induced abortions performed were reported. He also estimated that in
1955 the number of live births in the absence of abortion would have been twice (or
more) the number actually registered. I calculated the ratio of the maximum to the actual
general fertility rate to be 1.68 in 1955.
Because of the underreporting of abortions, my calculations may overstate the effect
of abortions on fertility decline. Since the underreporting was probably greater in earlier
years, the actual drop in the max mum fertility rates would have been greater, and the
effect of abortions on fertility decline smaller than I calculate.
16Between1920 and 1940, the rate of decline per decade in the general fertility rate
was about 13 percent.
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TABLE 4
RATE AND COMPOSITION oe PRacNANcIEsBYREGIONS,


























































































Souacss.—Pregnancies, births, and abortions from Shinozaki (1971); female population composition
from Japan Prime Minister't Office (1955, 196Db, 1965).
NOTE—Rate of Pregnancy =1000x (births+fetal deaths + abortions)/married women of child-
bearing age with husband present. Share of births =(births/pregnancies)x 100. Share of abortions =
(abortions/pregnancies)a 100. Regions are the same as in table 1.
Dissemination of birth-control measures other than abortions un-
doubtedly played some role in the decline in actual fertility rates, but in
the absence of estimates of the number of pregnancies prevented by the
use of modern contraceptive measures, one cannot directly assess its
impact on fertility. Since the efforts to disseminate birth-control in-
formation started only in 1952, the major effects of birth control on
fertility were probably felt during the late 1950s. Assuming that most
couples with accidental pregnancies turned to abortion as a last resort to
control fertility, the share of abortions compared with the share of actual
births in total pregnancies may provide information on the trend of
fertility demand and the use of contraceptives. Since abortions had already
become widespread by the middle of the 1950s, subsequent changes in the
share of abortions would reflect, to a large extent, an increased use of
contraceptives. Table 4 summarizes trends and differentials in the rate of
pregnancy and in the shares of abortions and births in pregnancies after
1955. There was a general increase of the share of births and a decrease
of the share of abortions in total pregnancies. For Japan as a whole, the
pregnancy rate among fertile women declined at an average 5-year rateS182 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
of 14 percent from 1955 to 1965. The rate of decline was greater in the
rural regions (21 percent) than in the industrial regions (6 percent).
Indeed, by 1960 the pregnancy rate in rural regions had dropped below
that in industrial regions. During the 10-year period, the rate of increase
in the share of births and the rate of decrease in the share of abortions
were both greater in industrial than in rural regions, suggesting that
"unwanted" pregnancies declined more rapidly in industrial areas.
What can one infer from these regional differences? Suppose that all
these differences are attributable to the differential spread of contraceptive
methods (i.e., differential reduction in costs of control). Then the implicit
assumption would be either that there was no change in demand for
fertility in industrial and rural regions, or that the decline in demand for
fertility did not vary systematically between the two types of regions.
The slower rate of increase in the share of births and the slower rate of
decrease in the share of abortions in rural regions would then presumably
be attributable mostly to a slower spread of contraceptive measures in
these regions. The more rapid decline of the pregnancy rate in rural
regions, however, is the opposite of what one would expect if contraceptive
measure did spread more slowly in these regions. Therefore, a more
plausible interpretation of these differences would rely on a combination
of differential change in fertility demand and differential spread of
contraceptive knowledge. One interpretation would be that fertility
demand declined more rapidly in rural than in industrial regions, resulting
in a more rapid decline of the pregnancy rate, but that the spread of
contraceptive knowledge was not rapid enough in rural regions to
diminish rapidly the use of abortions as a last resort to control fertility.
Although the changing age composition of females precludes a firm
judgment about the validity of the above interpretation,'this interpret-
ation is supported by a comparison of the 1955—60 and 1960—65 periods.
The pregnancy rate dropped more rapidly during 1955—60 than it did
during 1960—65 in both regions. If this was attributable entirely to the
spread of contraceptive measures, one would also expect to observe more
rapid changes in both the share of births and the share of abortions in the
earlier period. Indeed, given the early I 950s' reforms regarding the use
of contraceptives, this expectation would appear to be quite plausible, but
the course of events was just the opposite as both shares changed more
rapidly in the later period (table 4). Again, a more plausible inter-
pretation would be that demand for fertility continued to decline in both
periods; that the spread of contraceptives increasingly facilitated effective
The industrial prefectures experienced a slight increase and the rural prefectures a
rather large decrease in the proportion of women of childbearing age (table 4). These
changes in age composition undoubtedly explain in part the more rapid decline in the
pregnancy rate in the rural than in the industrial prefectures.POSTWAR FERTILITY IN JAPAN S 183
TABLE 5
DIFsusloN OF CONTRACEPTIVE USE BY EDUCATION LEVEL
(PERCENTAGE OF COUPLES UsING CONTRACEPTIVE DEVICES)
1950 1952 1955 1957 1959
All 19.5 26.3 33.6 39.2 42.5
Husband's education:
<9 . 14.2 18.2 28.2 33.4 37.6
10—12 25.4 37.0 37.7 46.5 43.9














<9 13.0 20.1 28.2 33.3 35.0
10—12 32.4 38.7 46.1 48.1 51.6













SouRce—Japan Ministry of Health and Welfare (1959).
NOTE—Range Is the between the largest and the smallest values. The MAD is the mean absolute
deviation. In all years except 1959, the data refer to couples with wife under age 49. For 1959, wife's age is
less than 50. The sample size varies from 3,500 couples in 1952 to 3,835 couples in 1959.
fertility control, thereby reducing unwanted pregnancies; and that the
role of abortion continued to diminish in importance as a control measure.
The above evidence documents an increased use of contraceptive
measures from 1955 to 1965. The relationship between parents' education
and the use of contraceptives was discussed in Section III irs the form of
the cost-of-fertility-control hypothesis. If there was a period in which the
use of birth control techniques was introduced or improved once and for
all, then this hypothesis predicts that differences among education groups
in the extent of use of birth control would widen at first, then narrow
gradually. In Japan, a marked increase in the availability of abortions and
birth control information occurred after 1948—52, so this period would
appear to provide a reasonably proper setting for testing this hypothesis.
Table 5 presents the percentage of families within education class
(husband's or wife's) that reported using some birth-control technique.
The data are taken from surveys conducted in selected years to determine
the attitudes of Japanese families of various socioeconomic classes toward
contraceptive usage. In most education classes, the proportion of families
using birth-control techniques increased over the years, presumably
because costs of control declined and benefits increased. The differences
across education groups in the extent of contraceptive usage as measured
by either the range or the mean absolute deviation (relative to the mean)
varied most in the early 1950s and persistently declined after 1952. One
detects a slight increase in these measures of dispersion in 1952 with theS184 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
TABLE 6
COMPLETED FERTILITY BY EDUCATION LEVEL
(AVERAGE NTJMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BoRN PER COUPLE)
1940 1952 1962 1967
All 5.10 4.47 3.91 3.36
Husband's education:
Low 5.19 4.62 4.05 3.45
Middle 4.81 3.62 3.60 3.27
High 4.17 3.47 3.21 2.92
Wife's education:
Low 5.19 4.57 4.04 3.48
Middle 4.39 3.58 3.47 3.14
High 4.74 3.13 3.09 2.69
Sougcrs.—Aoki andNakano (1967,table Ii) andJapanMinistryofHealth and Welfare (1968, various
tables)
NoTE—For 1940, the figure is for couples married more than 21 years; for 1952, couples with wife age 45
or older; and for 1962 and 1967, couples married more than 20 years. Schooling definitions are: low, less
than 10 years; middle, 10—12 years; and high, 13 years or more.
start of the campaign to disseminate birth-control information. These
findings, though based on sparse information, agree with the predictions
of the cost-of-fertility-control hypothesis.
Education and Fertility
The preceding discussion suggests that a decline in fertility demand and
increased access to abortions and birth-control information played a
joint role in producing the observed decrease in fertility in Japan. 1 now
explore the relationship between fertility and parental education in the
light of the hypotheses discussed in Section III.
Accordingtothetastesandcost-of-fertility-controlhypotheses,
education of either parent is expected to be negatively associated with
fertility. For Japan, education of the husband, because of his dominant
family role, is likely to be a more significant explanatory variable than
is the wife's education. The cost-of-time hypothesis predicts that the
husband's education will be weakly, but positively, associated with
fertility and that the wife's education will have a strong negative associ-
ation with fertility.
Table 6 presents a measure of completed fertility by education groups
for 1940, 1952, 1962, and 1967. The data are from Institute of Population
Problems surveys. Education of either parent generally is negatively
associated with fertility, in agreement with findings for other countries.
These data also document the persistently declining trend in completed
fertility at all levels of parental education, underscoring that education
is by no means the only factor contributing to the decline in completed
fertility over time.POSTWAR FERTILITY IN JAPAN Si 85
TABLE7









Actual 5.10 4.47 3.91 3.36 0.85
Standardized:
Husband's education ... 4.99 4.21 3.84 3.36 0.75
Wife's education 4.93 4.22 3.84 3.36 0.72
SouRcE—Calculated from table 6.
NOTE—Standardizedrates were calculated by using the 1967 distribution of couples by education of
husband and wife. The mean absolute deviation was calculated as the average of absolute deviations of
annual values from the 1967 value.
The negative association of fertility and the education of either parent
may at first appear to agree with the prediction of the tastes and the cost-
of-fertility-control hypotheses. Unfortunately, these data are not cross-
classified by education of parents, so that one cannot discern the "pure"
relationship between the fertility rate and the wife's and husband's
education separately. Since the levels of husband's and wife's education
are (positively) correlated, table 6 reflects the joint influence of both levels
of education. Since the correlation is not perfect, one may still attempt
(see table 7) to determine the relative importance of the education of
either parent in "explaining" observed differences in fertility.
Table 7 presents the observed completed fertility in the 4 survey years
and estimates of completed fertility obtained by using the 1967 distri-
bution of educational attainment of husband and wife. That the general
increase in the level of school attainment played a role in the decline in
observed fertility is demonstrated by standardized rates which are con-
sistently lower than actual rates in every year. The difference between
standardized fertility rates using husband's and wife's education appears
to narrow in later years. One reason for this tendency may be the increased
correlation of husband's and wife's educational attainment accompanying
a general increase in the dispersion and level of women's educational
attainment. According to the mean absolute deviation of yearly values
from the 1967 value (shown in table 7), the year-by-year differences in
the fertility rate are decreased when yearly rates are standardized by
education of either parent, but the reduction is somewhat greater when
the distribution of the wife's rather than of the husband's education is
used. Standardizing by the husband's education reduces the mean abso-
lute deviation by 12.8 percent; standardizing by the wife's education
decreases it by 15.3 percent. Thus, the trend in the distribution of the
wife's education appears to have been more important than that of the
husband's in the fertility trend.
Since the data for table 7 were not cross-classified by parents' education,
one could not directly observe the "pure" effect of the education of either1
Sz86 JOURNALOF POLITICAL ECONOMY
parent. To determine the relative magnitudes of the pure effects of
parents' education on fertility, multiple regressions of the following form
were estimatedusingcross-sectiondatafor46prefectures: C=
a +bl(EdHN)+b2(EdHH)+ cl(EdWN)+ c2(EdWH)+f(other variables)
+ u, where C = fertility rate; EdHN = proportion of males who never
attended school; EdHH = proportion of males who completed approx-
imately 10 or more years of schooling; EdWN = the same as EdHN, for
females; EdWH = the same as EdHN, for females; other variables = other
standardizing variables discussed in the text; and u = disturbance term.
Since time-series data on education and other variables are lacking for
Japan, as for many other countries, the regression analysis was restricted
to cross-section data. Regressions reported in table 8 use the average
number of children ever born for selected age groups of women (com-
pleted fertility) as the dependent variable; in regressions in table 9 the
live birth rate is the dependent variable. The Japanese census presents the
distribution of educational attainment in four categories—none, ele-
mentary, middle, and high. Instead of estimating a single measure of
educational attainment, such as the mean or median, I used two categories
of the education variable for each parent. One advantage in using these
measures is that the coefficients, that is, b1 and b2 for the husband and
c5 and c2 for the wife, may reveal differential effects on fertility of a shift
in the education distribution between the lower and the upper segments
of the distribution. The expected signs of the regression coefficients
according to the hypotheses discussed earlier are shown below:
Tastes and Cost ofFertilityControl* Cost of Timet
b1>O b2cO b1￿O b2￿O
c1>O c2<O c1>O c2<O
*Aweaker version of the above: —b1+ b2 <Oand —c1+ e2<0,
f A weakerversionof theabove: —5, + b20 and—cj÷ c2 < 0.
Regressions of Completed Fertility
For the regressions of completed fertility reported in table 8, each
observation was weighted by the square root of the number of age-
specific ever-married women in each prefecture. In addition to the
education variables, standardizing variables included in these regressions
are the percentage of persons, age 15 and older, employed in agriculture,
forestry, and fisheries, and the percentage of the population living in
urban areas. These variables refer to 1960 and therefore do not reflect
accurately the background in which the couples made fertility decisions.
For these variables to have substantive meaning, one must assume that
the majority of couples have lived in the prefecture they resided in in 1960
for most of their married lives and that the rankings of prefectures by










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































oPOSTWAR FERTILITY IN JAPAN S189
neither income nor earnings is held constant in these regressions for lack of
data pertaining to these age groups.
Regressions 1 and 2 were run for married women, ages 40—49 and 50—59,
respectively. No coefficient in regression 1is significant. The ambiguous
result obtained for this cohort may be partly because the majority of
these women were married during World War II times. Uncertainty about
the future and participation by males in war activities may have distorted
family-size decision making. The sizes of the regression coefficients for
the education variables satisfy the weaker prediction of the cost-of-time
hypothesis, however. For regression 2, the results are less ambiguous.
Judging from the t-values, both Ed,,Nand EdWNaresignificant at the
1 percent level, and the F-values for the education variables indicate that
both the husband's and the wife's education are statistically significant
at better than1percent. Both husband's and wife's education obtain
regression coefficients that are largely consistent with the cost-of-time
hypothesis.
To determine if the fertility relationships for the two groups of married
women were different, I tested three null hypotheses using Chow's (1960)
test for equality of two regressions. The three null hypotheses were that
(1) the two relationships are completely the same; (2) the two relation-
ships are the same except for the intercept; and (3) the two relationships
are the same only with respect to the education variables. The first null
hypothesis was rejected (F77, =10.93),but the latter two were accepted.
Based on these findings, I pooled the observations for the two groups and
obtained regressions 3 and 4. Regression 3 assumes that only the intercept
differs, while regression 4 assumes that everything except the education
coefficients differs between the two groups. The results for pooled re-
gressions 3 and 4 are quite similar. Both husband's and wife's education
are statistically significant at better than1percent, with regression
coefficients as expected from the cost-of-time hypothesis.
The results of these regressions clearly support the economic framework
based on the cost-of-time hypothesis. According to the coefficients of the
pooled regressions, male education variables higher by one standard
deviation unit, holding female education constant, are associated with
higher fertility by about 0.13 children. Holding male education constant,
female education variables higher by one standard deviation are associ-
ated with about 0.30 fewer children. However, the relationship between
education and fertilityisapparently nonlinear. The distribution of
either parent's educational attainment has a greater effect on average
completed fertility when it shifts from no education to some education
than when it shifts from some to high education.5' While influences of
18Ben-Porath(1973) reported a similar finding for Israel. In particular, the sharpest
decline in fertility was observed between women with no education and women with some
education.r 1
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education on fertility through tastes and the cost of fertility control are Add
undoubtedly present, the dominant influences appear to be through in- of female
come and prices. regressioi
These regressions refer to families which made fertility decisions before educatioi
and during World War II. One would expect the decision-making process —3.279
to have been more male-dominated in these than in postwar years. Yet about
female education is one of the most important variables in these regressions, and 4.
a finding which strongly supports the relevance of the economic analysis likely ta
of fertility. For this paper, regressions of completed fertility could not be - female
runfor families making fertility decisions during the postwar years, since labor-foi
the 1970 census was not available for all prefectures. As an alternative, I labor su
now turn to regressions of live birth rates in 1960. The noi
observed
are amt
Regressions of Live-Birth Rates
when
Multiple regressions of the number of live births in 1960 per thousand
married women, age 15 or older, are reported in table 9. In addition to statistic
the percentage employed in agriculture and the percentage living in
urban areas, these regressions hold constant the age composition of differeii
women and, in some cases, wage rates and labor-force participation rates. exampi
The age-composition variable is a weighted average of age-specific birth one sta
rates for Japan, the weights being the percentage of women in each age births
class in each prefecture. The percentage distributions of all women rather in
than of only married women were used because the latter may reflect gressiol
endogenous decisions about the timing and duration of marriage. Both female
the female wage rate and the female labor-force participation rate are
expected to affect fertility negatively. The male wage rate and the ,male
labor-force participation rate would capture income effects and are
expected, therefore, to obtain positive regression coefficients. Increa
The results for the birth-rate regressions are largely consistent with the
predictions of the cost-of-time hypothesis. An increase in male education, I cont
holding constant female education, increases, and an increase in female than i
education, holding constant male education, decreases the birth rate. rathei
Female educationisalways more significant than male education.
Female education tends to remain statistically significant with negative
effects on fertility even after the female wage rate and labor-force
participation rate, either separately or together, are introduced in the increa.I
regressions. As expected, the female wage rate obtains negative and Morea
significant regression coefficients. The male wage rate obtains coefficients
that are insignificant, though with expected signs. Neither the agricultural partid
employment nor the urbanization variable has significant coefficients, ordina
perhaps because urban-rural differencesinbirthrates had largely
disappeared by 1960 (see table 1). SUCCC5CONOMY POSTWAR FERTILITY IN JAPAN Sr 91
trol are Adding wage-rate variables to the regressions greatly reduces the effect
ugh in- of female education on the birth rate. Without the wage-rate variables in
regressions1 and 3, a uniform percentage shift upward in the female
3before education distribution reduces the birth rate by about 10, for example,
process —3.279 —6.322=—9.6for regression 1, but the magnitude drops to
irs. Yet about five when the wage-rate variables are introduced in regressions 2
essions, and 4. This finding is not surprising since the cost-of-time effects are
Inalysis likely to be captured jointly by female education and wage rates. The
not be female wage rate also reduces the magnitude and significance of the female
S, Since labor-force participation rate, as expected if decisions about fertility and
stive, I labor supply are made simultaneously on the basis of the wage rate.19
The nonlinearity usually observed in the effects of female education is
observed only when wage rates are held constant. Otherwise, the results
are ambiguous: the deterrent effect of female education appears greater
when education increases from some to high than from none to some
)USand schooling, though the regressioncoefficientsfor "high" are never
;ion to statistically significant.
ing in These regressions suggest that area differences in the birth rate reflect
ton of differences in the female variables more than in the male variables. For
rates, example, according to regression 2, increasing all the male variables by
birth one standard deviation unit, holding constant other variables, increases
:h age births per thousand married women by about three, but similar increases
rather in female variables decrease the birth rate by 10. Calculations for re-
eflect gression 4 show the effect of male variables to be + 1.2 and the effect of
Both female variables to be —10.9.
:e are
•male
I V. Summary and Agenda
Increased access to abortions in Japan undoubtedly contributed to the
hthe post—World War II acceleration of that country's decline in fertility. But
ition, I conclude that fertility would still have declined at a more rapid rate
male than in the prewar period, which had been characterized by a mild and
rate. rather monotonic decline, if abortion had not been legalized. Therefore,
tion.
A rise in the female wage rate, other things being equal, increases the attractiveness
brce of labor-force participation relative to home production, including child rearing. There-
the fore, increased female wage rates not only directly reduce fertility demand but also
increase labor-force participation, which in turn indirectly reduces fertility still more.
and Moreover, the direction of Causation may also run from higher birth rates in an area to
erits lower female labor-force participation there. To allow for such simultaneity, regressions
ural 3 and 4 were also estimated by two-stage least squares, treating female labor-force
participation as endogenous. However, these estimates did not substantially differ from the
ordinary least-squares estimates. The labor-force participation regressions seem to have
been plagued by multieollinearity. Although the regressions were statistically significant,
judging by the F-values, with coefficients of determination above 0.70, they did not
successfully disentangle the effects of the exogenous variables.POSTWAR
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dissemination of contraceptive information and/or an accelerated decline A Cci
in the demand for fertility must also have contributed to the trend.
Cross-section analyses of 1960 data reveal that the economic theory of
fertility, with its emphasis on the effects of female education and earning
power on fertility demand, provides a useful framework for analyzing
fertility differentials in Japan. In particular, regressions of completed
fertility and live birth rates in 1960 show that female education and Japan
earnings affect fertility negatively and are the most significant variables U.S. (w
in the regressions. Male education and earnings tend to have positive but
less significant effects. On the basis of only sociological, demographic, or U.S. (w
tasteconsiderations, one would not necessarily expect to find female Real GNI
education more important than male education in explaining fertility
differentials. Indeed, in Japan, because of the male's generally dominant Real
role in household decisions, one would have expected to find male educa-
tion to be at least as relevant as female education, if not more so, in
explaining fertility differences. Japan
How useful are these results in interpreting the fertility trends in Japan? U.S.
A tentative answer can be obtained from the regressions in table 9. Percenta1
Japan
Assuming that the parameter estimates remain stable over time and using U.S.
the observed magnitudes of change between 1950 and 1960 for all the
explanatory variables except for the age-composition variable, my results
predict the decline of births per thousand married women to be only 4
percent at the mean according to regression 2, and 3 percent according
to regression 4. The actual decline between 1950 and 1960 was about 42 For I
percent, of which one would hope to explain about half if legalization of
abortion explains another half. For the period 1960—70, both regressions deciinø
predict a decline, while in fact births per thousand married women
increased somewhat. On the basis of these results, one may be inclined declinl
to doubt the usefulness of cross-section regressions in interpreting the In I
trend.2° Japan
However, since the regression models and the economic hypotheses econol
underlying them pertain to long-run adjustments, one would expect from predic
these regressions better predictions of longer-term changes in fertility. It chang
is possible that the sharp decline of fertility during the 1950s and the and
subsequent leveling off in the 1960s represent swings around a longer-term States
trend that has persisted since l920.21 If so, a more appropriate corn- comp
parison of actual and predicted declines might be made between 1950 and 1
and 1970. The predicted decline for this period was 19 percent according
to regression 2 and 15 percent according to regression 4. The actual the p
decline was about 30 percent. These regressions appear, therefore, to be the I
more helpful in providing an interpretation of the longer-term fertility
20T. Paul Schultz (1973) discusses problems in the interpretation of time series from child
cross-section estimates of parameters. Here I ignore the kinds of problems he raised, quail
:\ similarobservation is made by Okazaki (1970, p. 26).
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TABLE10
decline A COMPARISON OF TRENDS IN FERTILITYANDECONOMIC VARIABLES: 1950—69
d.












































Japan 28.1 17.2 17.9*
















Real GNP per Capita: (1950= 100)
Japan 100 247.4529.3







Real wage (1950= 100):
Japan 100 170.2253.9







Percentage employed in agriculture:
Japan 48.7 30.0 17.8







Percentage female in non-agricultural employment:
Japan 29.0 35.1 36.6







SOURCES—U.S. data U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States(various issues and
U.S. Department of I-lealth,Education,and Welfare (1968a); Japanese data: Japan Prime Minister's Office.
Statistical Yearbook of Japan (various annual issues) and Mainichi Newspaper Company (1970).
Average between 1965 and 1970.
t Average between 1949 and 1951.
Average between 1957 and 1960.
§ Average between 1965 and 1968.
II For 1968.
declinein terms of price and income variables, but they are not likely to
facilitate understanding of the shorter-term movements by which the
decline may actually occur.
In table 10 some of the salient features of the United States and
Japanese experiences during the postwar years are compared. If the
economic framework for fertility analysis has general validity, it would
predict more rapid fertility changes for countries experiencing more rapid
changes in their economies. Clearly, both the economic variables examined
and fertility rates changed more rapidly in Japan than in the United
States during 1950—69. A similar point is observed if one confines the
comparison to the periods in which fertility declined: 1950—60 for Japan
and 1960—69 for the United States.
Much more work is needed before we fully understand the reasons for
the possible acceleration in the decline of fertility demand in Japan in
the l950s and the leveling off in the l960s. A promising area for in-
vestigation is the interaction of the demands for quality and quantity of
children in Japan. There may have been an accelerated substitution of
quality for quantity during the postwar years because of income effects.r
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Also, the prospect of future economic growth may have raised the ex- Comi
pectedreturnto education and rising family income increasingly
facilitated the financing of children's education beyond the level required
by law. It is noteworthy that the enrollment rate in kindergarten (which is
not compulsory) increased more sharply between 1950 and 1960 (by 95
percent per 5 years) than between 1960 and 1965 (by 58 percent). Also,
the errollment rate in senior high school (not compulsory) rose more
rapidly between 1950 and 1960 (by 26 percent per 5 years) than between
1960 and 1965 (by 20 percent). The model may also be extended to in- Gary'
dudesuch interrelated aspects of behavior as marriage and female
labor-force participation. Such a model may be estimated using more
disaggregated data, say by age, than I use here. The rapid decline in
Japanese fertility from 1950 to 1960 coincided with an increase in the
labor-force participation of females and a decrease in the proportion of
married women among women of childbearing age. For example, among
females, ages 20 to 39, living in urban areas, the labor-force participation At a
rate increased from 38 percent in 1950 to 43 percent in 1960, and the compal
proportion ever married decreased from 75 to 70 percent. The most econori
dramatic changes occurred for females, ages 20 to 24, among whom the at
proportion ever married dropped from 43 percent in 1950 to 31 percent
in1960 but showed no appreciable change in the 1960s. The pace of all extensi
these developments appears synchronous with the fertility history of resuitsi
postwar Japan, and possible relationships among them deserve rigorous studiei
analysis. Hashii
Finally, it would greatly enhance the scope and accuracy of analysis in T. I
to have micro, or household, data for Japan on such related character-
istics as fertility; wage rates and family wealth, age, and work experience; 1950s
parents' and children's education; and contraceptive use. Ideally, such bottot
data would be collected longitudinally for a given set of families and made partiC































ation At a conference of distinguished specialists on human capital theory my
I the comparative (absolute?) advantage isthe study of the Japanese
most economy. Much the same can be said forHashimoto's paper. No attempts
1the at any significant new departures in human capital theory or in the
cent testing of such theory are made in this paper. Rather, one finds here an
f all extension of a now-familiar approach to Japanese data with now-familiar
y of results.1 This is a study that can stand alongside the Israel and Taiwan
rous studies by Ben-Porath (1973) and T. Paul Schultz (1973), respectively.
Hashimoto's paper is another line, and an admirably executed line at that,
lysis in T. Paul Schultz's table Al (1973).
:ter- Hashimoto's ultimate concern is in explaining the acceleration in the
ice; 1950s of the long-term decline in Japanese fertility and the subsequent
uch bottoming out of this decline in the l960s. The achievements of this
ade particular paper are more modest. An attempt is made to challenge-what
m. Hashimoto finds is a simplistic overemphasis on the diffusion of abortion
and contraceptive practice after 1948 (i.e., a downward shift in the supply
of birth-control schedules). As an alternative, Hashimoto stresses outward
shifts of the demand schedule for birth control resulting from the in-
creasing cost of female time in postwar Japan.2
Hashimoto states that, previous to this paper, there had been but one other economic
study of fertility in Japan. This is a bit unfair. Only if the literature is restricted to that in
English and one assumes the economic study of fertility starts with Becker is this statement
true. Unlike the United States, in Japan throughout the twentieth century demographic
study remained within the province of economists. For a sample of Japanese work, see
Tachi and Arao (1935) and Tachi (1946).
2Myreading of the Japanese literature suggests that most Japanese demographers
would applaud Hashimoto's stress on changes in both the demand and supply schedules.
Some Japanese demographers do appear to part company with Hashimoto when it
comes to a discussion of the determinants of the demand-schedule shifts. There is a
Japanese emphasis on the role of wealth. Relative to the period prior to World \-Var II,
Japan of the early 1950s is seen as a poor country.
SI 95r
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I am much in sympathy with Hashimoto's hypotheses. There is this
considerable evidence to suggest that control of fertility within marriage birth-co1
was widespread long before 1948, and I do find stress on the cost of female in total
time provocative.3 At the same time, I do not think Hashimoto's various a pOsitiu
analyses are altogether persuasive. For example, if instead of using max- Whilq
imum crude birth rates and maximum general-fertility rates, maximum
total-fertility rates for 1950 and 1960 are calculated, it appears that the section 4
practice of abortion. might very well have tripled the rate of fertility theses is
decline.4 The decline in the estimated maximum total-fertility rate 8 and 9,
between 1950 and 1960 is 16.8 percent. This is only a modest acceleration fertility
of the 12.6 percent rate of decline exhibited in the actual fertility rates with thi
between 1930 and 1940. An acceleration of this magnitude might easily
be explained by the diffusion of modern contraceptive techniques during
the l950s.. This mild acceleration might also be viewed as a reaction to the marryill
much higher-than-trend total-fertility rates between 1940 and 1950. the age
Thus, it would appear that if Hashimoto wishes to stress the role of 4 to
demand factors in the acceleration of Japanese fertility decline, he more enforce
than likely cannot avoid an inquiry into the extent to which legal of some
abortions were substitutes for older forms of birth control. substan
Regardless of the magnitude of the acceleration remaining to be ex- or aftei
plained by some factor other than the legalization of abortion, I am not the
satisfied with Hashimoto's analysis of the spread of contraception. That 1900.
the share of abortions in total births is high and rising in the rural regions The
of Japan in the presence of a sharply declining pregnancy rate can be
taken as evidence that the spread of contraception is not sufficient to in the
explain fertility changes unexplained by the legalization of abortion only for feti
if (1) abortion as a technique of birth control is already completely
diffused, and (2) abortion is viewed as a technique of last resort.5 fertilill
I doubt either of the above conditions held for Japan during the l950s. educal
Abortion diffused throughout Japan in much the same manner and only
6
slightly in advance of modern contraception. At any point during that
decade,for any age cohort, the better educated a couple and the larger Tb
the city in which a couple lived, the higher the probability they had Japan
experienced an abortion. Among couples who had never practiced
contraception, the probability of an abortion experience was relatively
low. Significantly, high rates of abortion were found among couples who suggesi
had practiced contraception and for one reason or another discontinued
adiscussion of the history of birth control in Japan, see Honjo (1941). In
The maximum total fertility rates in 1950 and 1960 are 4.16 and 3.46. I have or ot,
calculated these rates with data taken fromJapan Ministry of Health and Welfare (1967) from
and Aoki (1967). perCe*
The industrial-rural dichotomy presented in Hashimoto's table 4 is based on a
comparison of six urban prefectures with five rural ones. As an alternative, the share of
induced abortions among pregnancies of Japanese women not living in cities of 50,000 fectul
or more (the rate typically regarded as the rural rate) can be examined. This rate rose
throughout the 1950s, reaching a peak in 1961 (see Aoki [1967, P. 44]). in tONOMY COMMENT S197
Lereis this practice.6 I would conclude that abortion was not necessarily a
srriage birth-control technique of last resort and that the rising share of abortions
female in total pregnancies in rural areas during the l950s might very well reflect
arious a positive reaction to the diffusion of a new technique.7
• max. While Hashimoto does not make manifest the need for a new demand
imum variable to explain the movement of postwar Japanese fertility, the final
at the section of his paper does stand on its own as a test of competing hypo-
rtility theses in explaining regional differentials. The results reported in tables
-rate 8 and 9 tend to support Hashimoto's de-emphasis of the role of the cost of
ration fertility control. In both sets of regressions, I have a particular problem
rates with the education variables Hashimoto chooses to use as explanatory
easily variables. The male education variablesinthecompleted-fertility
uring regressions are based on the assumption that Japanese women are
:0the marrying Japanese men of the same age. Actually, Japanese women of
1950. the age cohorts in question were marrying men who were, on the average,
'le of 4 to 5 years older than themselves.8 The peculiarities of the Japanese
more enforcement of their compulsory-education legislation make it a matter
legal of some importance whether a male reached school age before 1900 (as a
substantial proportion of the husbands of the women in these cohorts did)
ex- or after 1905. There was considerable variability among prefectures in
not the degree of male compliance with the compulsory education laws before
That 1900. After 1905, compliance was almost complete among the prefectures.9
ions The degree of compliance across prefectures is only weakly correlated
1be between the two periods. Interestingly enough, noncompliance for males
.tto in the earlier period is rather strongly correlated with noncompliance
)nly for females in the later period.t0 It follows that if one is a believer in the
tely cost-of-fertility hypothesis (and only if one is a believer in the cost-of-
fertility hypothesis), it is possible to argue that the errors in the male
SOs. education variable are imparting a positive bias to the estimate of the
nly
hat
6Thesurveys on which the above analysis is based were conducted and periodically
Uer published by the Mainichi Newspaper Company (1950); see also Taeuber (1958, p. 282).
There is every reason to believe that the spread. of contraceptive methods in rural
sad Japan was rapid in the late 1950s. The aforementioned Mainichi surveys indicate a
:ed better-than-25-percent increase in contraceptive practice between 1955 and 1959. These
elt, same years saw family-planning expenditures by Koseisho (Ministry of Health and
/ Welfare)at their real height. Also, survey evidence analyzed by Aoki (1967, p. 57)
nO suggests that increases in contraceptive efficiency were also greatest during this period.
.ed
8Summarystatistics on the average age at first marriage, by sexes, are available in the
annualreports, DescriptiveMaterials on Japanese VitalStatistics,published by the Japan
Prime Minister's Office (19 17f).
In 1900, the percentage of the male school-age population attending primary school
ive or otherwise complying with the compulsory-education laws ranged across prefectures
7) from 79.1 to 97.5 percent. By 1905 the degree of compliance varied from 94.7 to 99.5
percent. These statistics are from annual reports published by Japan Ministry of Education
a (1904f).
of Using the 1960 census data, the simple correlation coefficient between the pre-
00
. fecturalpattern of males with no education, age cohorts 50—59 and 60—69, is .39. The
se simple correlation coefficient between the prefectural pattern of males with no education
in the age cohort 60—69 and females with no education in the age cohort 50—59 is .83.Si98 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
coefficient of the no-education variable for females and a negative bias would si
to the estimate of the coefficient of the no-education variable for males, puzzle fc
These biases could be quite substantial and might account for Hashimoto's and the
interesting results.
Unlike the completed-fertility regressions, Hashimoto's regressions
reported in table 9 deal entirely with postwar reproductive activities and
specifically with 1960 live births. The education variables in these re-
gressions refer to the entire (over age. 15) prefectural population. Un-
fortunately, virtually the entire interprefectural variation in the proportion
in the no-education variables relates to the experience of age cohorts that
in 1960 were well beyond their reproductive years! I do not doubt that,
inspired by Leibowitz's paper in this volume, work can be done on how
a mother's education affects a daughter's fertility, but this is not the
hypothesis in question.'1
Also with respect to these same regressions, I am a bit puzzled by the
use of the logarithm of earnings rather than arithmetic earnings. I suspect
one gets a higher t-statistic on female wages when this form is used, but
when using what should be thought of as grouped data, I am unsure of the
theoretical justification.
In concluding my remarks, I would like to offer a suggestion for future
research. Notwithstanding Hashimoto's very useful analysis,I do not
find the postwar period to be the most interesting stretch of Japanese
demographic history. While thereare many instancesof fertility
decline in the context of rapid economic growth, the experience of Japan
between 1875 and 1920 appears to be unique. There was rapid economic
growth starting from a relatively high income base, a declining agri-
cultural labor force, a revolution in female education coexisting with a
high and, as recent research indicates, very likely a rising level of
fertility.'2 Further, in view of the Japanese experience after 1920, I
Nationwide, 82 percent of men with no education and 96 percent of women with
no education came from the age groups 50 and older and 40 and older, respectively. The
simple correlation by prefecture for never-educated men above age 50 and younger than
age 50 is .25. The simple correlation by prefecture for never-educated women above and
below age 40 is .21.
52 The official statistics collected for Japan suggest rising fertility throughout most of
this period. These statistics have been traditionaUy treated with considerable skepticism
on account of underreporting in the earliest periods. Taeuber, in analyzing these statistics,
suggests that fertility probably rose substantially during the first part of this period and
subsequently declined slowly (see Taeuber [1958, pp. 52—54]). Estimates which allow
for the traditional criticisms of the official statistics have been prepared by Okazaki
(1965). Okazaki estimates that the Japanese population in 1875 was almost 2 million
above the official statistics. More recently, Akasaka Keiko has provided another series of
alternative estimates. Somewhat surprisingly, in view of the earlier criticisms, she finds
that the official statistics overestimate population by 600,000 in 1875 and understate the
rate of population growth at least through 1910. For Akasaka's estimates, see Hitotsubashi
University Institute of Economic Research (1968). For an informative discussion of the
alternative estimates, see Umemura (1969).COMMENT Stgg
ye bias would submit that this episode constitutes a fascinating and important
males puzzle for those who would stress the role of economic factors in general,
irnoto and the cost of time, in particular, in the explanation of fertility history.
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